Tuesday, December 20, 2005

Excerpt from Klaus Guenther, "World Citizens between Freedom and Security," Constellations, v. 12, no.3, 2005.

"While the market state withdraws from the internal space of consumer freedom
and largely leaves global economic competition to itself--since any legal regulation
is exclusively measured by whether it expands or constricts the space of
options, raises or minimizes transaction costs--the opposite is the case for the
realms in which threats to this internal space grow. These are the dysfunctional
side-effects described above: migratory movements, organized crime, internal
malfunctions of the economic system, as well as, most recently, international
terrorism. In addition, consumerist freedom, like any increase of freedom, has its
threatening dark side: increasing individualization, the dissolution of social ties
and traditions, the risk of failing in economic competition and thus becoming one
of modernization and globalization'€™s losers. It is probably out of the experience
of these risks that there develops a massive fear of crime, which bundles together
the fears of a multi-option society. The other, with his highly individualized
multiplicity of options, becomes a security risk. Here is where the security state
comes in. The economic reforms in the United States under Ronald Reagan and in
Britain under Margaret Thatcher were accompanied by a massive tightening of
criminal and penal law. The liberation of the economy from the state rested on a
simultaneous restriction of traditional civil rights, which was nevertheless
asserted as 'freedom through the state'€“ namely, as protection of consumerist
freedom from threats from third parties. These third parties are situated outside
the deregulated internal space, and thus excluded in any case, or excluded on the
basis of their lack of success in marketing their labor power. From the internal
perspective of the protected space of the multi-option society, illegal immigrants
are in a way the exemplary figure of what one must protect oneself against: like
free-riders of the '€œprisoner'™s dilemma'� central for the legitimation of the marketstate,
they want to gain illegitimate access to the space of security and freedom, to
enjoy its advantages without having to share its costs. Since it has to do only with
these unauthorized gatecrashers, the demands of constitutional criminal and
police law can sink without the connected restrictions on freedom being experienced
by the majority as a threat."

So, will Domestic Spying merely be absorbed into the logic of the Security State?

2 comments:

post festum said...

Wouldn't this be a necessary feature of regulatory power where it should not show as so-called "big gov't"?

Wolin (27): "Public and private power are intermingled, and the result is not a net reduction of stat power but its articulation through different forms. The appropriation of public goals by private enterprise means that state power is being decentered w/o being decentralized. State power is being expanded...Contrary to the official interpretation, these tendencies do not signal a decreat in the state's apparatus...The new location helps to obscure their coerciveness by transferring formal accountability from traditional political processes, such as legislative oversight and elections, to the allegedly impersonal forces of the market."

post tot discrimina rerum said...

I'm not sure what you mean by "regulatory power." I also, then, don't understand why it would be a necessary feature of it.

One thing he Wolin quote explains that of course, just because you have more market freedoms, doesn't mean that state power is lessened. Guenther's argument is consistent with that, but I think is adding something new. In light of expanded market freedoms a clear expansion of state power in terms of security, i.e. criminal law, immigration law, and yes, terrorism law, has occurred. (Here is where you might mean that these are necessary steps in response to increasing market freedoms. But, then, I'm not sure why they would be necessary rather than choices made by specific people that could have made differently). In addition, this expansion of state power is not rejected by the increasingly individuated (and thus more 'freedom loving') populous because they don't perceive the expansion of state power as applying to them. Wolin, in this regard seems to be talking about something like outsourcing security services to private industry, which is, despite "the official interpretation," an expansion of state power. I guess that is anothe r element of hiding the "big government" as you put it, from the people.